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Abstract. The aim of article is to conduct comparative-legal research of legislative acts establishing legal background 
of shareholders’ agreement conclusion and execution in certain foreign states and Ukraine along with presentation 
of ways to improve the relevant Ukrainian legislation. Subject of research is the experience in area of legal regulation 
of shareholders’ agreement conclusion and execution in certain foreign states and Ukraine. Меthodology. Research 
is based on comparison of shareholders’ agreement conclusion and execution in Ukraine, USA, Russia and Western 
Europe (Italy, Switzerland and Germany). Author defines advantages and deficiencies of shareholders’ agreement 
conclusion and execution methodology and opportunities to implement relevant foreign practices (on the basis 
of comparative-legal analysis of specific provisions of civil legislation of Ukraine). Results of this research proved 
that in order to implement foreign experience related to legal support of shareholders’ agreement conclusion and 
execution strict civil law sanctions must be imposed. These measures are applied in the case if there are violations 
of shareholders’ agreement provisions. We consider that reimbursement is the most efficient and appropriate 
sanction for commitments deriving from the  shareholders’ agreements including voting procedure at general 
meetings, approval of voting format by other shareholders, coordination of actions related to management, key 
activities, JSC reorganization and liquidation due to the fact that reimbursement amount is defined by the parties 
and does not depend on damage inflicted, is not reduced according to the court ruling and may be applied along 
with other civil law sanctions.  Practical implementation. Positive experience of development of legal background 
for shareholders’ agreement conclusion and execution in certain foreign states proves that law enforcement 
procedures require identification of relevant agreement legal nature as for quite a long time these documents have 
been used by corporate relations parties. Сorrelation/originality. Comparative analysis of Ukrainian, European and 
American legislative acts regulating shareholders’ agreement conclusion and execution has become a foundation 
for presentation of certain amendments.  
Кey words: foreign experience, analysis, agreement, legal doctrine, shareholders, EU states.
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1. Introduction
Analysis of the legislation and practice of foreign 
countries has demonstrated that shareholders 
agreements as a tool for individual and legal regulation 
of the relations between shareholders are admitted in 
many legal systems. There is a certain imbalance in the 
legislation of European countries. Legal acts of Italy and 
Russia contain provisions on the procedure for making, 
executing and conditions of the researched agreements. 
But in Germany, France and Switzerland there are no 
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special provisions for regulating the relations between 
shareholders through agreements. This is fully applied 
to Ukraine. However, legislative and regulatory 
compliance practices needs to clarify the legal nature 
of the relevant agreements, since they have long been 
used by the members of corporate relations. However, 
the legislation in many countries does not provide a 
clear answer both to the question about the parties, the 
content, the object of a shareholders agreement and its 
legal nature.
At the current stage of state formation Ukrainian 
integration to EU is acknowledged as prerequisite of 
further successful democratization and strengthening 
of civil society position (Medvedev, 2014). Тhat is why 
radical social and economic transformations of the last 
decade led both to positive and negative outcomes for 
Ukraine (Pavlenko et al., 2017). 
Therefore, American and European experience is so 
important and valuable as regulation of shareholders’ 
relations gradually becomes a matter of great interest 
in the light of international cooperation and trade 
facilitation and orientation towards state prosperity and 
security. 
Аnalysis of latest research and publications. 
Significant contribution to research of problems 
related to comparative analysis of legislative acts 
and legal doctrine of Ukraine, USA, Russia and EU 
states was made by numerous scholars: Е.  Sukhanov, 
V.  Vasiliieva, E.  Haymann, R.  Müller, I.  Spasibo-
Fateieva, М. Sibilev, V. Yarotskyi, I. Hewitt, V. Chionna, 
G.  Cian; Alberto Trabucchi, О.  Kibenko, V.  Belov, 
N.  Кuznetsova, R.  Маydanik, Y.  Kokhanovskaya, 
Т. Abova, D. Mayer, G. Stedman, J. Jones, D. Lomakin, 
V.  Gureiev, N.  Karzhavina, D.  Stepanov, V.  Litovkina, 
K. Yaroshenko, Y. Romanova, Y. Petrova, I. Venediktova. 
The aim of article is to conduct comparative-legal 
research of legislative acts establishing legal background 
of shareholders’ agreement conclusion and execution in 
certain foreign states and Ukraine. 
In this regard Resolution of Plenum of the Supreme 
Court of Ukraine dated from October 24, 2008 No. 13 
“On the practice of corporate disputes reviewed by 
the courts” provides that the activities of joint-stock 
companies (hereinafter - JSC), the relationships 
between the founders (shareholders), as well as issues of 
corporate management are regulated by laws and other 
legal acts of Ukraine, in particular, mandatory norms, 
disregard of which violates public order (p. 8-9).
However, despite the opposition expressed by some 
experts concerning the application of the researched 
legal category within joint-stock relations, we have 
to note that the concept of “joint-stock transactions” 
was first legalized by the Law of Ukraine “On Joint-
Stock Companies” (we use the term of “transactions 
between shareholders”) (On Joint-Stock Companies, 
2008). Such an allocation of the group of contractual 
obligations by the national legislator borrowed from 
the Anglo-American legal system, where the joint-stock 
transactions they understand agreements between 
shareholders on the management of corporation, voting 
procedure, contains restrictions on expression of will 
and other use of the corporate vote (Vasylieva, 2008).
Shareholders agreements are known to German 
law, which is close to Ukrainian law. The German law 
allows the concert between shareholders to vote at 
the general meeting by concluding the agreement 
(stimmbindungsvereinbarung) (Spasybo-Fateeva et 
al., 2014). Analyzing the German, French and Italian 
professional literature on the formation of doctrines on 
shareholders agreements we may observe in each case 
that the emergence of such contractual relationships is 
the result of the formation of the doctrinal foundations 
of their appropriateness and legality. It mainly concerns 
such an aspect of corporate relations, as the issue of 
voting compared to the demand on the freedom of 
exercising the rights in one’s sole discretion.
Certain German experts in the middle of the 
XX-th century maintained their points of view of 
the admissibility to disclaim and limit own will and 
interest of the rights that is derived from participation 
in a business entity. It is stated that the coherence of 
a member of a company, in case of concluding the 
agreement on a certain way of voting, shall not be 
considered during the voting at the general meeting as 
more than a contradiction of his freedom to vote by 
any way, but rather it is an expression of his freedom 
(Fischer, 1953; Weber, 2000). 
Shareholders agreements are common in the corporate 
practice in Switzerland. Their legality and admissibility 
is admitted by most scholars and court practice. 
Analysis of doctrinal and practical research in this 
country leads to the conclusion that over a long period 
of existence of this problem as an object of research 
and practical interests, there is a sufficient scientific 
and practical understanding of the role and significance 
of shareholders agreements as a tool of accessory 
regulation and protection of corporate interests of 
shareholders (Aktienübernahmevereinbarungen zwischen 
Mehrheits und Minderheitsaktionären: ein Vorschlag zu 
einem wirksamen Minderheitenschutz, vor allem in kleinen 
und mittleren Aktiengesellschaften, 1973).
Legislative foundations for the possibility of 
concluding shareholders agreements in Switzerland 
are general norms of contractual and corporate law. 
The Art. 27 of the Civil Code of Switzerland, which 
proclaims the principle of freedom of an agreement and 
inadmissibility of excessive obligations, should be called 
as the general basic norm of civil law. This principle is 
determining both for using shareholders agreements 
and for establishing the limits of their specific content.
It is historically that in France there is somewhat 
different situation for the recognition of the possibility 
to conclude a shareholders agreement. Thus, agreements 
between the shareholders of the duty to vote in a 
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certain way were banned in France. It is associated with 
the understanding of the role of a shareholder, who 
participating in the general meeting shall decide on the 
basis of free will principle (Sonnenberger, 2000). Later 
in court practice such agreements were admitted, but 
with certain restrictions, in particular concerning the 
timing of their action and content.
In England shareholders agreements regulate 
relations arising in connection with the management 
of the company, establish the dividend policy, are 
aimed at addressing “deadlock resolutions”, may impose 
restrictions on the disposal of shares: call option, put 
option, pre-emptive rights on acquiring shares by the 
shareholders, lock - up provisions, tag along rights, drag 
along righs (Hewitt, 2016).
Italy is one of the few EU countries, where the civil 
law contains special provisions aimed at regulating the 
procedure of concluding shareholders agreements. 
Such a decision of the Italian legislator was not a 
reflection of general European tendencies (Chionna, 
2008). Italian experience in regulating shareholders 
agreements is of particular interest for studying this 
issue because we can observe the characteristics along 
with the fact of the presence of special norms of the 
civil law on such commitments, indicative, in particular 
to the norms of other states, such as the Art. 32.1 of 
the Law of the RF “On Joint-Stock Companies”. This is 
due to the fact that many provisions of the Italian civil 
law on this issue were borrowed by Russian legislator 
concerning a joint-stock company.
In legal doctrine presented approaches were not 
unequivocal supported. In particular, Ye. O. Sukhanov 
asserts that a shareholders agreement according to its 
legal nature is a civil and legal contract on exercising 
shareholders’ rights, not a “corporate transaction”, 
which determines the structure of the corporation’s 
management (Suhanov, 2014). V. A. Bielov does 
not support the position about a “clean” contractual 
nature of the researched relations between the 
shareholders indicating that they (relations) should 
be considered as “unilateral half-directed transactions 
with a plurality of persons on the side, which exercise 
them” (Belov, 2013).
There is a question whether shareholders agreements 
are the kind of civil and legal contracts, or whether they 
are independent type of contracts governed by the Civil 
Code of Ukraine, but being outside the civil law, and are 
the object of other area – corporate law, the object and 
method of which are under the scientific discussion for 
many years.
Binding and legal rather than corporate nature of 
the shareholders agreements is generally admitted in 
European corporate law. Derived from here is their 
binding nature only for persons who have signed 
them, but not for the whole corporation. Thus, in 
case of violation of such an agreement by one of the 
shareholders, contractual responsibility can be relied on 
him, but the results of voting and decisions taken by the 
company are legally valid and can not be challenged.
In Germany and Switzerland the shareholders 
agreements, usually are not considered as an independent 
type of agreement. The prevailing view is that it should 
be understood as agreements of shareholders that 
regulate legal relationships of the shareholders or groups 
of shareholder between each other (Mayer, 2006). The 
basic norm that determines the admissibility of the 
shareholders agreements under German civil law, is 
the provisions enshrined in c. 5, § 23 of German Law 
“On Actions” (Aktiengesetz vom 6. September 1965), 
under which “provisions supplementing the charter of 
the company are admissible, if the law does not contain 
an exhaustive regulation”.
The shareholders agreements in German legal 
literature and practice are almost unanimously qualified 
as agreements on common activities and are regulated 
by §§ 705-740 of the German Civil Regulations on 
the agreement of partnership. However, it should be 
noted that the shareholders agreement in the form 
of “partnership” can solely exist, when its parties 
are only individuals, who do not have the status of 
entrepreneurs. In other cases, such agreements are 
considered as binding and legal agreements on the 
ways and peculiarities of realizing the rights to shares 
and rights from them and are regulated by the general 
norms on contracts. Similarly, this issue is solved in 
Swiss legislation, which recognizes several forms of 
real expression of the shareholders agreements: single 
and double sided binding agreements, a partnership 
agreement (Müller, 1998). The latter in most cases is 
the basic form of fixing binding relationships between 
the shareholders.
Analyzing the experience of legislative regulation of 
the shareholders agreements in Germany, Switzerland, 
France, one can conclude that, firstly, these countries do 
not use legal concept – “corporate agreement”. None of 
the countries of continental Europe does not apply the 
legal terminology of foreign countries in its legislation, 
including legislation on joint stock companies 
(exceptions are Latin terms and names of some legal 
institutions that are quite specific to any country or the 
group, such as the concept of “trust”). Anglicisms, which 
are followed by the modern adjective “corporate” may 
be used only as a doctrinal concepts. National legislator 
and the corresponding doctrine analyze, compared and 
receive legal structures used in other countries  – it is 
a natural process of international and interstate legal 
communication. However, we seek to use legal concepts 
that are specific to the national language. Thus, the 
Art. 2341 bis of the Civil Code of Italy uses the term 
“Patti parasociali”, which is literally interpreted as “an 
agreement concerning the company”. Herewith the 
Italian legislator does not use the adjective “corporate” 
(«corporativo»), because the word “corporation” is 
used in a rather narrow sense, as a rule, to refer to groups 
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based on membership, sometimes without a legal entity, 
for example, trade unions.
The legislation of most countries in Europe does not 
contain a legal definition of the shareholders agreement. 
The exception is Italy, which civil law designates such 
agreements in different ways, including both the 
term “shareholders agreements”, and other terms that 
emphasize the variety of such agreements according to 
their nature and spheres of application. In particular, 
the shareholders agreement are designated as patto 
parasociale (also contratto parasociale). Besides such 
term as sindacato azionario is used. It means agreements 
of shareholders with the terms for selling the shares. 
The term sindacato di blocco is used to state the type of 
shareholders agreements providing specifically only the 
condition for not selling the shares.
Thus, we can specify that the legislation of European 
countries does not generally contain the definition of 
the category “shareholders agreement” that is because of 
the fact that the corresponding construction has found 
its development and grounding within court practice 
and legal doctrine. However, the absence of such a 
definition only makes embarrassment, because does not 
allow to give a definite answer to some questions – one 
of which is the subjective matter  – the parties under 
such an agreement.
There are three approaches to the establishment 
of the parties of the shareholders agreement. They 
are: 1) shareholders only (Lomakyn, 2008; Suhanov, 
2014); 2) shareholders and a company (Hureev, 2007; 
Karzhavyna, 2007); 3) shareholders, the company 
and third parties (Spasybo-Fatieieva, 2009; Stepanov, 
2013).
Paying attention to guarantees of the minority 
shareholders, Yu. V. Romanova indicates that 
shareholders agreements under the laws of France, 
the United States and other countries, are concluded 
between the shareholders (Romanova, 2004). 
Despite the fact that corporate law does not literally 
establish that it is the company or third parties, who 
are not its shareholders, can be a party to such an 
agreement, but still we need to recognize that neither 
the company nor persons who are not its members 
can be a party to the shareholders agreement under 
current regulations, there are no corporate relations 
outside the legal entity. 
The second position related to the definition of 
the subject matter of the shareholders agreement is 
limited to the fact that it can be concluded between 
the shareholders or between the shareholders and the 
company, as the shareholders agreement signed only 
between the shareholders does not obligate the joint 
stock company to anything, which in turn, makes little 
sense in the agreement itself (Hureev, 2007; Karzhavyna 
“Shareholders' agreement as a way of corporate conflict 
overcome and the problem of its validity under the 
Russian”, Business Law, 4 (2007).
Why is there a need in practice to include a company 
among the parties of the shareholders agreement? 
According to D. I. Stiepanov, it is for the reason that the 
bodies, which are derived from the general meetings of 
the corporation members through the corporation that is 
involved in this agreement as the party, had to be obliged 
to fulfill decisions taken by its members. Typically, the 
scholar continues, the company may be a party either of 
an agreement, where all of its shareholders take part, or 
an agreement, which involves not all the shareholders, 
but where the corporation receives only the rights, but 
bears no obligations to other parties of the agreement 
(otherwise the rights of other shareholders, who do not 
participate in the agreement could be violated in favor of 
the parties to the agreement) (Stepanov, 2013).
This approach is confirmed by the international legal 
practice. In particular, provisions, by which the company 
becomes a party to a shareholders agreement, are more 
common in England (Stedman, Jones, 1998).
It is worth paying attention to the existence of the 
third approach. Thus, I. V. Spasybo-Fatieieva believes 
that the shareholders agreements relate to the concert 
between the shareholders (Spasybo-Fatieieva, 2009) 
..., however, continued her position, notes that not only 
the shareholders can be their subjects, but also future 
shareholders (investors) (Spasybo-Fatieieva, 2009). 
Instead, O. M. Vinnyk offers acknowledge founders, 
shareholders and/or potential shareholders  – persons, 
who subscribed for shares of additional issue, as the 
parties of the shareholders agreement (Vinnyk, 2010).
The main reference of the supporters of the third 
approach is the fact that the company lenders and other 
third parties may enter into an agreement with the 
shareholders, whereby the latter, in order to guarantee 
the interest of third parties protected by the law, 
undertake to exercise their corporate rights in a certain 
way or to abstain (abandon) their implementation, 
including, to vote in a certain manner at the general 
meeting of the company members, to take other actions 
to manage the company, to acquire or dispose the shares 
in its authorized capital (shares) at a specified price and 
(or) under certain conditions to refrain from alienation 
of a shares (interests) to the occurrence of certain 
circumstances. The rules on corporate contract are 
applied to such an agreement (Abova, 2013).
Let’s study these approaches. Since the shareholders 
agreement has the appropriate name, the first thing 
making any associations  – is its recognition by the 
parties of only the shareholders. As we have already 
noted, the number of shareholders who conclude the 
shareholders agreement may be any, besides these can 
be both majority and minority shareholders, who have 
decided to protect their rights by consolidating their 
capabilities, these can be shareholders  – individuals 
or shareholders – legal entities, these may be only two 
shareholders or all shareholders of a company without 
exception. It is obvious that only the shareholders are 
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the parties of the shareholders agreement, only they 
acquire the rights and obligations under this contractual 
structure, execution of which is realized through the 
implementation of actions by the shareholders, the 
most common of which is the transfer of property and 
advance voting in a certain way.
The shareholders in a joint stock company are 
not in legal relations between each other, but the 
latter may arise between them, if they conclude an 
agreement. In this case, there will exist two kinds of 
legal relations in a joint stock company  – between a 
joint stock company and each shareholder (corporate) 
and between the shareholders who entered into an 
agreement (contractual). The latter include not all the 
shareholders, but only those who signed the agreement. 
It does not act for the rest of the shareholders. Therefore, 
the execution of such an agreement should be made 
by those shareholders, who are its parties (Spasybo-
Fateeva et al., 2014).
The proposition to participate in this agreement for 
both the company in the whole (herewith, the decision 
will be determined not by all of its shareholders, but only 
the parties of the shareholders agreement) and any third 
parties, including those, who did not buy the shares of 
a company (was not involved in the formation of the 
company’s property), but got essentially unlimited 
ability to determine the decision of a joint stock 
company, is not reasonable. We believe that even if these 
third parties will be lenders of a joint stock company, 
their crucial part in the affairs of a company is able to 
make no sense for other shareholders to participate in it, 
not even mentioning the fact that the interests of third 
parties and shareholders are not identical.
European continental law does not usually recognize 
the opportunity of third parties that are not shareholders 
to participate in the shareholders agreements. Since these 
are only the shareholders, who determine the purpose 
of its activities, and fix it in the statute and determine 
its fate, thus, only they have the right to participate in 
shaping the will of a company (and third parties by 
obtaining mastery over the votes of the shareholders 
may get the opportunity to influence the decisions 
of the corporation, the risk and the consequences of 
which take the shareholders of a company, but no the 
third parties). Negative attitude to participation of third 
parties in the shareholders agreements is also due to the 
fact that they are excluded from the traditional corporate 
responsibilities to act in good faith and in the interests of 
the corporation in the whole (Suhanov, 2014).
Instead, third parties according to English legal 
practice (potential buyers of shares) may be parties 
of the shareholders agreements obliging themselves 
by the provisions of an agreement of shareholders 
by signing the deed of adherence (Petrova, Khrapov, 
2008). Founders of a company often seek assurances 
that while the alienation of shares by anyone of them, 
a new purchaser will be bined with the terms of the 
shareholders agreement, and thus, the prolongation of 
the direct contractual nature of relationships between 
all the stakeholders will assured. Accordingly, the 
shareholders agreements subordinated to English law, 
almost always include a condition that the registration of 
the fact of transfer of shares into the property to another 
person may occur only under the condition of joining 
a new owner to an existing shareholders agreement by 
signing the deed of adherence. In case of the alienation 
of a small number of shares by one of the members of 
the shareholders agreement, other shareholders-parties 
may require restrictions of the deed of adherence 
to obligations on the compliance with some certain 
provisions – such as the conditions on confidentiality, 
obligations not to be engaged in competition, certain 
obligations related to decision-making and voting, etc.
We believe that the company can not be a party to the 
shareholders agreement because it does not have the 
status of a shareholder and can not be a shareholder of 
itself. In the case that it bought the shares of its own issue, 
they are “dumb” until their alienation to already existing 
shareholders or third parties. Besides this possibility 
could bring to life “circular reference” – the management 
of the company subordinated to shareholders should 
ask their permission for the inclusion / non-inclusion of 
any condition of the agreement.
We should express some doubts regarding the 
recognition of potential investors as parties under the 
shareholders agreement. If we accept the possibility 
for third parties to participate in the conclusion of the 
shareholders agreements, we should also recognize 
the expansion of limits of shareholders relations that 
would come out the limits of a joint stock company. If 
we agree with the fact that the company creditors have 
the right to direct the actions of the shareholders of a 
particular company in the interests of third parties, 
thereby affecting the management of a company, would 
this situation cause the management of a company not 
by its shareholders, but by third parties. On the one 
hand this possibility is aimed at ensuring the interests 
of creditors and on the other – there is a question if the 
application of such a norm would lead to the occurrence 
of negative effects such as violation of corporate rights 
of the shareholder by persons, who are not members 
of shareholders relations, corporate capture or 
acquisitions, corporate conflicts.
The issue of the content (terms) of the shareholders 
agreement and especially its object is still very urgent. 
To clarify this issue we should refer to the law and legal 
doctrine of European countries.
In countries, where the shareholders agreements as 
a legal structure are recognized at the legislative level 
(Italy and Russian Federation), the norms focused on 
their regulation, contain the list of the obligations that 
may be the object of such agreements. However, the 
regulation of the object of the shareholders agreements 
has fundamental differences. In general, the legislation 
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of these countries contain similar obligations, but if 
the norms of Russian legislation regarding the types 
of specific obligations have the nature of a possibility 
(the Art. 32.1 of the Law of Russian Federation “On 
Joint Stock Companies”), the norms of Italian law 
unequivocally confirm that only obligations listed in 
the Art. 2341 bis of the Civil Code of Italy may be the 
object of such agreements. Besides, the structure of the 
p. 1 of this Article makes it possible to conclude that 
only those agreements, which provide the obligations 
listed respectively in points a) – c), may be recognized 
as the shareholders agreements, if they are concluded 
for the purposes set out in the same norm. Thus, the 
shareholders agreement in Italy can not contradict the 
mandatory norms of the law, its object is very limited.
Regarding the object of the shareholders agreement 
within English legal literature it has been noted noted 
that the main objective of joining it is the regulation 
of corporate rights and obligations of the shareholders 
both under the conditions of executing shares’ sale and 
purchase agreements, and during the creation of joint 
enterprises, including international ones (Osypenko, 
2010). Thus, the shareholders agreements on the 
territory of the United Kingdom, except the norms 
similar to the standards of memorandum, usually 
contain a more detailed description of the objective and 
scope of activities regarding joint ventures, procedure 
of financing the company and agreed on shareholders’ 
deposits in non-cash form; policy of profit distribution 
(Makarova, 2010).
Such agreements in the French corporate law can 
generally refer only voting of shareholders and only 
during specific meetings (not during any period of time) 
and subjected to other serious limitations (Sukhanov, 
2014).
Specific types of obligations that may be the object 
of such agreements are describe more differentiated 
in Germany and Switzerland. This is due to the fact 
that authors, as a rule, list the specific typical kinds of 
obligations, which are the basis for the conclusion of 
the shareholders agreements. Their detailed analysis 
demonstrates that they are covered by such types as the 
obligation to exercise voting rights, obligations to the 
features of the alienation of shares and obligations to the 
company. There are also atypical cases, but they are not 
common in the practice of concluding the shareholders 
agreements. These include obligations to third parties, 
not the shareholders about the transference of the 
rights, etc.
The German and Swiss legal doctrine offers to 
allocate such types of obligations that may be the 
object of the shareholders agreement, as a) to vote at 
the general meeting in a certain way, for example, only 
together under the previous concert or according to 
the suggestion of one of the parties; b) to sell shares 
only under certain conditions, for example, only by the 
consent of other shareholders; c) obligations to grant 
the right of preferred purchase under the pre-set price, 
in case of selling the shares; d) to provide (retreat) to a 
third party, for example, the voting rights to a creditor of 
the shareholder; e) to provide one of the shareholders 
the right to appoint his representative to the supervisory 
board, irrespectively to his share (Mayer, 2006; 
Schramm, n. d.).
The Law of Ukraine “On Joint Stock Companies” 
does not contain clear indication on the aspects 
of the company’s activities and specific actions of 
the shareholders that should be the object of the 
shareholders agreement. The bill No. 4160 dated from 
February 26, 2016 “On Amending Some Legislative 
Acts of Ukraine on Corporate Agreements” has defined 
the object of such an agreement, which may be the 
realization by the shareholders their rights to shares 
and/or the rights under shares, as well as laying duties 
according to own will of the shareholder – the parties 
of the agreement, leading to the conclusion that the 
shareholders may agree to establish a special procedure 
for decision making by the general meeting or the 
procedure of formation and activities of the executive 
agencies, supervisory board, to determine the procedure 
of conflict resolution, etc.
Based on the principle of the freedom of the 
agreement, the shareholders-parties of such an 
agreement have the right to agree on the validity 
term and correspondantly specify the exact day of its 
termination (or the event that terminates it). In practice, 
the parties may establish any validity of the agreement 
and predict the circumstances entail the automatic its 
termination (for example, liquidation of the company, 
its reorganization, bankruptcy, etc.). We believe that 
more effective measure to plan the termination of the 
agreement will be the establishment of its validity or 
classical way of termination – concert of the parties.
The form of the shareholders agreement. Freedom 
of the agreement in corporate law may be subject to 
limitations as according to the content, as under the 
reasons depending the document or the form it should 
be expressed.
Shareholders agreement is concluded in written form 
by drawing up one document signed by the parties. 
This approach is, in general, traditional. However, it 
should be noted that in Germany and Switzerland it 
is allowed to conclude such agreements also orally. In 
accordance with p. 2, c. 1 of the Art. 32.1 of the Law of 
Russian Federation “On Joint Stock Companies”, the 
shareholders agreement is concluded in a written form 
by drawing up one document signed by the parties. As 
a consequence of non-compliance with simple written 
form of the agreement entails its invalidity.
English law also does not require a specific form of the 
shareholders agreement, but in practice it is concluded 
in a simple written form or in the form of «deed». Oral 
shareholders agreement according to English law is 
theoretically possible but in practice can not be applied. 
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If the parties of such an agreement under English law are 
legal persons, they can sign the agreement in two forms:
1) simple written form. For its adherence the 
shareholders agreement must be signed by a person 
authorized by the Supervisory Board. Typically, this is 
one of the members of the executive body, but may be 
another person who has any document confirming the 
authority to sign;
2) «deed» form (while concluding the shareholders 
agreement according to this form there are different 
options):
a) sealed by the companies – parties to the agreement 
and signatures of the persons authorized by the 
constituent documents (signatures of two directors or 
secretary and director of the company or other persons 
authorized by the Supervisory Board);
b) the signing by two directors or a secretary and director 
of the company in the presence of a witness. The witness 
also must sign, specifying the address, place of work and 
position (according to the Art. 44 of the English Law on 
Companies, 2006).
c) signing according to the proxy notice (in this case 
the proxy notice must be made in the form of «deed»). 
If an authorized (trusted) person is an individual, his 
signature must be placed in the presence of a witness 
(who must also put the signature, indicate his address, 
place of work and position). If the trustee  – another 
legal entity (company), then it must fulfill all the same 
formalities as if the document is signed on its behalf. 
However, in both cases, an authorized (both individual 
and legal entity) person is obliged to notify that he acts 
on behalf of another person according to the proxy 
notice.
In all cases the document must specifically state that it 
is – «deed». If it is assumed that the document («deed») 
does not take effect until the specific moment or event 
in the future, thus containing a pending condition, this 
fact must be due to the parties – mainly to avoid doubts 
or disputes in the future, in a written form through 
correspondence, presentation in a separate document, 
etc. In the absence of any indication on this intention of 
the parties will be deemed that «deed» came into legal 
force immediately after realization of all formalities.
Consequently, the shareholders agreement is 
concluded in a written form by drawing up one 
document signed by the parties. Shareholders who 
signed it are obliged to inform the company about the 
fact of its conclusion. In case of default of this obligation 
the shareholders who are not parties to the shareholders 
agreement, are entitled to demand compensation for 
their losses.
Content of the shareholders agreement creates a set 
of the rights and obligations. There is a question: 
how agreements are brought into accord between 
shareholders (those rights and obligations provided by 
them) with corporate rights, rights for shares and rights 
from shares that are limits of acceptability restricting 
shareholders’ rights, which are established by the 
agreement and ultimately lead to their inequality and 
whether they are valid.
It is rather difficult to provide the exact definition of 
“deadlock provisions”, owing to the lack of a unified 
approach to its description. In general, it is characterized 
as the inability to achieve the consent by the shareholders 
on key points of the activities of a joint-stock company. 
It often occurs, when the shareholders have different 
views on the issues of forming management agencies, 
spending the profits, determining the strategy of the 
company’s development. To resolve deadlock provisions 
there are various options for action. Let’s pay attention 
to some of them.
Russian Roulette. Quite comprehensive solution, 
which main point lies in the fact that in the case of 
“deadlock situation” one or both shareholders make 
another shareholder the proposal of repurchasing the 
half of already priced joint-stock. The shareholder who 
receives such notification has the choice to cell his stock 
for the marked price or, conversely, to buy the other 
shareholders’ stocks for same price.
Texas Shoot-out. Each shareholders' agreement 
party which is in the “deadlock situation” forwards 
to independent mediator sealed proposal for price to 
buy another parties’ assets. The envelopes are opened 
simultaneously and the highest price bid wins, so the 
person who made it has to buy and the other side has to 
sell its shares for price as marked.
Multi-choice procedure. This mechanism is milder in 
comparison with referenced hereinabove. It is used 
when parties don’t want to enter into an obligation of 
severe and concrete deadlock situation solution. For 
example, this mechanism can provide specified set of 
predetermined options one of which will be chosen 
in fine. The advantage of such method is that parties 
in view of irreversible consequences connected with 
shares loss could act more reasonably and find the 
compromise solution. But the disadvantage of this 
model is than in case of effective negotiation process 
and final arrangement absence the process can draw 
down and affect the company activity. The parties 
would be bound to resort to arbitration which would 
decide what option has to be used. This circumstance 
brings some uncertainty in deadlock situation 
solution.
Cooling-off (mediation). Its main point is that 
shareholders stipulations provide the parties’ duty to 
carry on negotiations using an outside mediator till the 
decision won’t be found. If the mutual decision won’t be 
found through the process of negotiations, the so called 
judgment of Solomon should be taken by mediator on 
the basis of principle of reasonableness. From the first 
glance this method is mild but there is a possibility that 
the judgment of Solomon will be that parties should 
wind up a company as far as they failed to solve the 
dispute by negotiations.
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Deterrence approach. This mechanism should detain 
the parties from solving the deadlock situation by 
withdrawal of one party from shareholder's composition 
without resolving of disagreements by discussion. This is 
achieved by including in the contract, in a certain sense, 
onerous regulations for the party, which nevertheless 
initiates this procedure. Instead of activing negotiations 
proposition and subsequent statement of impossibility 
to make a decision on key issues this party can come 
straight to the notifying about the deadlock situation. 
In this case the party which forwarded the notification 
should either buy out the other side shares for 125% of 
their fair market price or sell its’ share to the other side 
for 75% of its fair market price. This value is determined 
with the assistance of appraisers and auditors. Such 
mechanism is still not always effective because on 
the one hand it excludes negotiations as method of 
discrepancies elimination and on the other hand 
maintains certain parties’ interests balance violation 
that could paralyze the activity of the company.
Parties’ responsibility by the shareholders 
agreement. Civil legislation highlights five main 
forms of responsibility: restitution, compensation of 
moral harm, penalty payment, loss of downpayment, 
compensation payment. However, those measures are 
difficult in applying to the parties of share agreement. 
Because of that, in practice are traceable cases of other 
forms of responsibility application inherent in foreign 
law, such as compulsory shares sale. For example we 
can give a shareholders agreement between Swissport 
International Ltd, ZAO “Airline” Ukraine International 
Airlines”, Airline Business Handling Limited where was 
pointed the question of voting at the general meeting and 
the result of nonobservance was the duty of one party to 
dispose its’ share in favour of other party, this became 
the responsibility measure for disregard of provision. 
However, both science and practice gives ambiguous 
answer to the question: whether it is appropriate to 
provide an opportunity to attach in provisions of such 
agreement measures (forms) of responsibility not 
foreseen by civil law and, consequently, the possibility 
of judicial protection of the parties in the case of failure 
or improper performance of their obligations under the 
joint stock contract?
By the shareholder agreement may be provided 
measures of civil liability for its failure or improper 
fulfillment. Separate question is responsibility for 
dereliction of such duties because art. 29 of the Law of 
Ukraine “On Joint Stock Companies” says only about 
shareholders’ responsibility for breaking the duty of 
participation in the general meeting. Clumsy phrasing 
of this provision may affect the addressing of the issue 
of bringing to responsibility shareholders for the failure 
to fulfill other obligations established by the agreement 
between them.
One of topical issues is one about possible 
consequences of shareholders agreement 
nonfulfillment, particularly, ways to protect 
shareholders’ corporate right in case of such agreement 
breach. In case of its violation by one of stockholders 
on him can be imposed a contractual liability in form 
of obligation to compensate damages to other parties 
or pay the agreed in advance penalty, but the results 
of voting and corporate decisions remain legally 
enforceable and can’t be contravened on that basis.
According to English law shareholders agreements 
are assured by court defense as a usual contractual 
obligation. Thereafter, shareholders’ protective means in 
case of provisions violations are: a) liquidated damages 
levy – in English contract law damages are not punitory 
but compensatory, in other words it don’t have the 
penal character; b) specific performance  – demand 
of stipulated by the contract obligations fulfillment; 
c) injunction for specific activities interdiction 
(injunction).
In this case certain treaty provisions (warranties) 
give the shareholders right only for restitution, whereas 
other (conditions and representations) give the right for 
restitution and voidance of contract.
Although Italian and Russian legislations contain a 
reference to the norms of Civil legislation, but orient 
to use common methods of collateral for commitments 
taking into account the specificity of obligations 
which originate from shareholders agreement. Italian 
practice uses such methods of obligations collateral as 
forfeit, pledge of shares. In Russian Federation, on the 
contrary, only some measures which can be used in 
case of nonexecution of shareholders agreement exist: 
a) reparation of damages, caused by its infringement; 
b) award of a penalty, fine, mulch; c) payment of the 
consideration (firm amount or amount that should 
be defined under procedure outlined in shareholders’ 
agreement); d) imposition of sanctions resulting from 
agreement infringement. 
One of substantive issues of shareholders’ corporate 
rights protection techniques is possible consequences 
of shareholders agreement nonexecution. As a result of 
such agreement institute integration to the corporate 
practice appears an opportunity for shareholders to 
protect their interests at the contractual level, that is 
now used insufficiently.
Mandatory duties performance in kind. The Law of 
Ukraine “On Joint Stock Companies” contains no 
express statement of possibility to specific performance 
(for example, make the shareholder to vote at the general 
meeting in a certain way). For the aim of defining the 
ability or inability to claim for specific enforcement at 
the fore should be the condition of obligation after the 
violation happen to be. Nonperformance (improper 
performance) of duties according to the shareholders 
agreement by stockholder can cause: 1) the termination 
of obligations and abandonment of it unfulfilled, 
2)  the existence of delay in execution of shareholders 
agreement. Agreeably, claim for specific enforcement 
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can be brought only in latter case, in other words, in case 
when shareholders whose rights were infringed does 
not take actions that could be interpreted as a waiver 
of joint stock agreement or acceptance of defective 
performance.
In case of non-property liabilities infringement, 
envisaged by the joint stock agreement (for example, 
shareholders refusal from voting in specific way and 
so on) specific performance is inadmissible in case of: 
a) such liability has strictly fiduciary nature; b) such 
liability is hard to fulfill both from the perspective 
of real possibilities shareholder who has violated 
shareholders agreement and in terms of court 
decision implementation; c) claim to complete this 
obligation is not brought within a reasonable period 
of time after shareholder whose rights were violated 
by nonperformance or improper performance of 
shareholders agreement came to knowledge about 
committed violation. 
Foreign legal literature, concerning the issue of 
application of liability measures for shareholders 
agreement violations, a long time already is recognized 
possibility of judgment for specific performance in 
case of such agreement terms violation. In particular, 
H. Appenzeler considers in detail the problem of this 
measure application and admits that his party whose 
rights have been violated, may fundamentally require 
not only compensation of caused damage, but also 
actual obligation performance (Appenzeller, 1996). 
A similar point of view expresses R. Muller, noting 
that as one of the measures of responsibility, in case of 
shareholders agreement violation can be used claim for 
specific enforcement (Müller, n.d.). P. Forstmoser also 
declares the right to claim for specific performance by 
party which violated shareholders’ agreement measures 
(Schluep, Forstmoser, 1988). 
Specific enforcement is not an appropriate mean of 
protection, because there are no mechanisms which 
would allow to force him to vote, for example, like it’s 
stipulated in the agreement, as if it could be possible 
in some another agreement. There is also absent 
the possibility to put into use such consequences as 
consider the shareholders-parties of the agreement will 
automatically expressed during the voting, for which 
reason, no matter in what way he voted, consider his 
vote given for adoption of a decision for which he was 
obliged to by the agreement. Along similar lines is not 
acceptable during the shareholders vote count on the 
result of voting to check whether the vote of shareholder 
who signed the agreement corresponds the obligation 
he’s assumed by voting in a certain way. 
Recognition of the transaction invalid and application 
of the consequences of its invalidity. In contradiction 
from Ukrainian joint stock legislation Law of Russian 
Federation “On Joint Stock Companies” (P.  4 
of Art.  32.1) expressly provides that agreements 
committed by a failure to comply with conditions of 
share agreement are disputable. For example, if for the 
purpose of agreement violation party commits the shares 
disposal before a certain event, this purchase agreement 
could be invalidated by judicial procedure on the claim 
of its other side, if it’s proved that buyer knew or must be 
taken to have known about set restrictions. Considering 
that the content of shareholders agreement parties 
correspondence (including limitations foreseen there) 
de jure shall be kept confidential a need in efforts arises 
in order to prove in court that the third person knew or 
should have known about the limitations stipulated in 
the contract. From the practical point of view it would 
be appropriate to consider that moment and provide 
in certain agreements some provisions containing 
warranties of relevant agreements noninfringement 
and also establish measures corresponding to parties’ 
liability. 
Invalidation of general meeting decision. Such method 
of violated rights defense is not quite new to corporate 
law. The share of legal controversies on invalidation 
of extraordinary and annual shareholders general 
meetings and as well as meetings of joint stock company 
supervisory board are almost half of all the joint-stock 
disputes being considered by the courts. To solve 
them the Resolution of Plenum of the Supreme Court 
of Ukraine dated from October 24, 2008 No. 13 "On 
Practice of Court Consideration of Corporate Disputes" 
is used successfully enough (Resolution of Plenum of 
the Supreme Court of Ukraine, 2009). In this regard it 
seems to be explicable to capture this method of violated 
right protection in the Art. 16 of Civil Code of Ukraine. 
However, to answer the question about the possibility of 
its application in case of shareholders agreement breach 
is not so simple as it seems at first glance.
On the purpose of keeping a balance of interest 
between shareholders and third parties Law of 
Russian Federation “On Joint Stock Companies” 
establishes that shareholders agreement violation 
can’t be the foundation for invalidation of company 
bodies’ decisions. Thus, if agreement is established 
as a result of company decision making (these are 
significant company transactions and interested-party 
transactions) then it shouldn’t be considered invalid, 
even if its settlement breaks shareholders agreements’ 
treaties. So, if, presumingly, shareholders agreement 
settles the duty of all shareholders to vote at the general 
meeting in a certain way and this duty is infringed, for 
example, by stockholder who has controlling block of 
stocks, it’s impossible to consider this decision invalid 
because of agreement unfulfillment. The only possibility 
for stockholder whose rights will be infringed is to 
claim for usage of penalties to shareholder-violator, of 
course if such measures are stipulated in the agreement. 
This regulation will be logical ending for the rule that 
shareholders agreement is obligatory only for its parties.
So, such an agreement, for one thing, sets aside 
of corporate law regulations and, for another thing, 
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can’t create any legal effects for third parties including 
company personally, stockholders who didn’t take 
part in that, company contractors. This position is 
not one and only. In foreign legal doctrine significant 
expansion has approach, supported by Russian law 
scientists as well, which insists on necessity of giving the 
possibility for shareholders of non-public corporations 
to influence the relations within the corporation. Law, 
for example in USA and the Netherlands, recognizes the 
permissibility of non-public corporations’ shareholders 
to asset agreements aimed at changing the legally 
established regulations governing internal relationships 
in the corporation. Among practice lawyers exists the 
opinion that legislator shouldn’t exclude the possibility 
of influence of shareholders agreements’ violation on 
validity of company bodies decisions so peremptory. 
The decision about permissibility or impermissibility 
of such position should be decided taking into account 
type of stockholders relationship and whether the rights 
and interests of third parties are affected by decision 
made with breach of an agreement. If we are talking 
about, let’s say, about JSC which structure is built by 
closely held corporation model (where is small amount 
of shareholders and company shares are disallowed 
for trading) which has strong element of shareholders 
personal participation in company affairs, their actions 
are coordinated and interest are pretty equal, in that case 
arrangement violation could have influence for decision 
validity measurement.
Invalidation of shareholders general meeting 
decision in relation to adoption procedure violation: 
shareholders voted for decision in violation of 
undertaken by agreement obligations to vote in a certain 
way (for certain candidate for some position and so on) 
according to I. V. Spasybo-Fatyeyevoyi appears to be 
unacceptable protective measure as far as consequences 
of unfulfillment of an agreement by shareholders 
(arrangements for voting at the general meeting) should 
ensue only for this arrangement parties but not for the rest 
of shareholders. But general meetings decision causes 
consequences for all shareholders and its invalidation 
irreversibly will have an impact to all shareholders and 
JSC itself (Spasybo-Fateeva et al., 2014). That’s why 
fulfillment or unfulfillment of shareholders’ agreement 
can’t be the reason for general meetings’ and other 
company bodies’ decisions invalidation.
The restitution can’t always be adequate measure against 
shareholders’ agreement nonobservance because of its 
proving complexity. Thus, according to Art. 16, 611 of 
the Civil Code of Ukraine, the party which violated the 
obligation must compensate the other party inflicted 
losses – actual damage, as well as loss of expected profit. 
Upon the request of damages recovery plaintiff must 
prove the wrongfulness of inflictors’ behaviour, his guilt 
(in accordance to requirements of art. 614 of the Civil 
Code of Ukraine), nature and extent (assessment) of 
adverse consequences, cause and effect relationship 
between actions (inactions) of the offender by the 
consequences occurred. According to the content of the 
above-mentioned norms of the Civil Code, damages, 
being property losses, are the subject of proving in 
every specific case of its’ infliction. For shareholders 
whose rights were inflicted by shareholders agreement 
unfulfillment it will be quite difficult, and sometimes 
even impossible, to prove the fact of damage infliction 
and to determine its amount. For example, actions 
of shareholder who sold shares to the third party in 
disregard of prohibition established by shareholders 
agreement for its’ off-load within specified time, 
undoubtfully, will cause negative consequences for 
other agreement parties making more complicated 
implementation of company projects, putting under 
threat the company achievement of previously set targets 
and tasks that may cause the risk of failure to obtain 
dividends by shareholders, may lead change of the 
Supervisory Board and (or) the sole executive body and 
so on.  However, it will be quite difficult to prove 
cause and effect relationship between such shareholders 
actions and possible negative consequences for other 
parties of this agreement as well as estimate the amount 
of expected profit loss.
In the opinion of R. Muller, in order to secure the 
obligations that are derived from the shareholders' 
agreement, it is possible to apply such methods: 
a)  contractual penalty; b) deposit of shares; c)  pledge 
of shares to cover contractual penalties; d)  transfer 
of shares to the common ownership of the respective 
shareholders; e) contribution of shares into holding 
company; f) transfer of the authority to the representative 
- the third party, who exercises the rights and obligations 
stipulated by the shareholders agreement; g) transfer 
of shares to the trust management of an independent 
third party or several persons; h)  establishment of 
shares purchase pre-emptive right in case of agreement 
violation; i) establishment of majority decision 
voting procedure among persons participating in the 
agreement (Müller, n.d.). 
Contractual penalty usage is one of the most 
popular measures of derived from shareholders’ 
agreement obligations collateral. However, a 
significant disadvantage of using this means of 
securing obligations is the fact that the forfeit 
amount can be reduced in a judicial proceeding. 
Besides, considering the fact that the consequences 
of such agreement violation mostly can’t be valued 
in monetary terms, it’s not so obvious which forfeit 
could be "commensurable" with the consequences of 
obligation infringement. We believe that the forfeit 
will be an effective mean of the obligations fulfillment 
insurance utility if shareholders agreement prescribes 
such parties obligations as purchase or dispose shares 
by predetermined price and (or) in case of some 
circumstances occurrence to retrain from shares 
disposure till certain circumstances occur.
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The possibility of using the majority of effective 
methods on ensuring obligations’ performance depends 
on the parties’ ability to entrench the amount which 
should be payed in case of nonexecution the shareholders’ 
agreement obligations, particularly, the amount of 
forfeit. It allows to use such methods of obligations 
fulfillment ensuring as, actually, forfeit, pledge and also 
guarantee. Shareholders agreement should be secured 
by the measure which definitely allows parties to predict 
the consequences of performance failure or its improper 
performance. That is what determined the appearance 
of such method of responsibility for this agreement 
violation as compensation, which remains firm and 
fixed amount that should be payed in case of agreement 
breach.
Compensation for shareholders agreement violation 
has purely warranties nature which provides proper 
obligations performance provided by this agreement. 
It is necessary to point out that appearance of such 
responsibility measure as compensation appears to 
be the implementation of one of the basic Civil law 
principles  – freedom-of-contract doctrine and its real 
enforcement. Upon that bona fide shareholder receives 
the possibility to decompensate not only losses but also 
moral harm which evolves unprejudicialy.
One of the most up-to-day and the most complicated 
questions connected with the usage of compensation 
in case of shareholders agreement violation is question 
about possibility of decreasing the compensation 
amount in legal proceedings. Compensation should be 
correlated with a monetary assessment of the adverse 
consequences of obligation breach. There are not 
foreseen and cannot be foreseen all possible measures 
of identifying the amount of caused harm because of 
variety of relevant actual facts of obligation breach. 
However, in each specific case the shareholder who goes 
to court for protection of the violated right and demands 
vindication of the compensation from violator should 
justify not only legality, but also economic expediency 
of settlements procedure offered by him that sometimes 
appears to be difficult, especially while calculating the 
expected profit loss. That’s why legislator provides 
parties of shareholders agreement the possibility to 
assess beforehand and in their own right the amount of 
losses that can be caused by each specific violation of 
such an agreement.
In our opinion, compensation is the most universal 
and effective measure of responsibility of the parties to 
the shareholder agreement. First of all, compensation 
is established by the parties and can not be reduced at 
the court decision. Secondly, for its appliance there is 
no need to prove the existence of losses. Thirdly, the 
compensation recovery does not exclude the possibility 
of restitution in case of their existence.
To protect the shareholders’ rights in case of 
shareholders agreement infringement and exclusion 
of legal uncertainties in the matter of applying the 
compensation in corporate law, it seems advisable to 
add to the Art. 29 of the Law of Ukraine “On Joint Stock 
Companies” by the regulation about if the regulations of 
a shareholders agreement are violated, the guilty party 
should compensate affected party the losses stipulated 
in the contract terms. Only in that case, compensation 
could be recognized as the most effective protective 
measure for shareholders agreement parties and could 
be admitted as an essential guarantee of agreement 
fulfillment by its parties.
2. Conclusions
Research of the problem of civil and legal regulation 
of the shareholders agreements in Ukraine, the USA, 
Russia and Western European countries (by the 
example of Germany, Italy, Switzerland and France), led 
to the following conclusions.
1. The shareholders agreement  – is an agreement 
concluded between the shareholders and is aimed 
at determining the procedure of actions, rights and 
obligations of the parties directly related to the 
management of a joint stock company, profit distribution, 
implementation of the rights and obligations of the 
shareholders, the decision of “deadlock” situations, if 
the number of votes of shareholders, who have different 
points of view on the decision of any matter, is equal.
2. Objectives of the shareholders agreement  – is to 
regulate the behavior of the shareholders in any given 
situation. For example, to predict the distribution of 
seats and the balance of power in choosing the next 
part of members of the executive authority or to define 
different restrictions on the sale and purchase of shares 
of a joint stock company, i.e., the prohibition to sell 
shares to a certain point or, conversely, the obligation to 
buy shares of other shareholders under certain events.
3. Generalizing analysis of the legislation and 
doctrinal sources of the considered systems of justice 
of European countries and Ukraine makes it possible 
to distinguish the most characteristic features for 
the notion of shareholders agreement. First, the 
shareholders agreement is concluded in regard to the 
rights of shareholders; secondly, it provides methods 
or the peculiarities of the implementation of the rights 
of shareholders, including those not under the law and 
the charter of the company; thirdly, such agreements 
are of relative nature – their action is spread only for the 
parties of obligations.
4. Indication of the purpose of the shareholders 
agreement in a regulatory form will make it possible 
to define its legal nature more precise, to make 
interpretation of the relevant norms regulating such 
agreements, to distinguish them as the legal construction 
from other similar agreements and to ensure prevention 
of abuse in exercising the rights by the shareholders.
5. In accordance with the legislation of European 
countries the shareholders agreement is concluded in a 
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written form, in Switzerland and Germany it is possible 
to conclude it orally, but in limited cases. There are no 
additional requirements to the form of shareholders 
agreements, in particular there no registration 
requirements or notary registration of such agreements 
even if they supplement the provisions of the statute. 
We believe that shareholders agreements are to be 
concluded in a written form by drawing a single contract 
signed by the parties.
6. The relationships between shareholders settled 
by the shareholders agreement is not an analogue 
of corporate relations within a joint stock company. 
The joint stock company and other shareholders of 
that company may not be aware about the existence 
of the agreement. Therefore, we can not talk about 
its “normative feature” or in other words “generally 
binding character” for all shareholders of the 
company. The action of such an agreement is not 
extended to the sphere of functioning and activities 
of the company.
7. Measures of civil and legal liability applicable for 
the violation of the terms of the shareholders agreement 
are quite diverse. We believe that compensation is the 
most versatile and effective measure of liability for the 
obligations that derive from shareholders agreements, in 
particular such as to vote in a certain way at the general 
meeting, to coordinate the voting options with other 
shareholders, to agreed other actions related to the 
management, activity, reorganization and liquidation of 
the joint stock company due to the fact that the amount 
of compensation is determined by the parties and does 
not depend on the availability of damages, which can 
not be reduced by the decision of the court and can 
be used along with others measures of civil and legal 
liability.
8. The adjudgement to perform specifically is allowed 
in case of the violation of a shareholders agreement 
because it is not against the law in most cases and can 
be an effective mean of guaranteeing the rights of the 
shareholders. However, from a practical point of view, 
the real adjudgement of obligations, in case, if the 
object of a shareholders agreement is the obligation on 
voting procedure, will be ineffective mean to protect the 
interests of their parties.
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